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Abstract
This article presents an agent-based model designed to explore the development of cooper-
ation in hunter-fisher-gatherer societies that face a dilemma of sharing an unpredictable re-
source that is randomly distributed in space. The model is a stylised abstraction of the
Yamana society, which inhabited the channels and islands of the southernmost part of
Tierra del Fuego (Argentina-Chile). According to ethnographic sources, the Yamana devel-
oped cooperative behaviour supported by an indirect reciprocity mechanism: whenever
someone found an extraordinary confluence of resources, such as a beached whale, they
would use smoke signals to announce their find, bringing people together to share food and
exchange different types of social capital. The model provides insight on how the spatial
concentration of beachings and agents’movements in the space can influence cooperation.
We conclude that the emergence of informal and dynamic communities that operate as a
vigilance network preserves cooperation and makes defection very costly.
Introduction
Discovering when cooperative practices first emerged, how they evolved and what factors
brought them into existence and influenced their continuity is an issue of paramount impor-
tance for the social sciences [1–8]. Social and environmental interaction, innovation and con-
flict shape social evolution, producing a high degree of variability. This variability provides an
interesting and promising field for identifying the rules and mechanisms embedded in the
emergence, maintenance and change of social cooperation.
In the case of hunter-gatherer societies, two challenges must be faced. First, the history of
these societies is mostly traced by studying their material culture and cooperative practices are
difficult to identify in the archaeological record. Second, these societies are attractive laboratory
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cases for attempting to understand, in small-scale contexts, what kinds of situations, behav-
iours and attitudes fuel or prevent social cooperation.
Using ethnoarchaeology as our methodological framework [9–14], we performed a series of
experiments using agent-based model computer simulation to tackle cooperative practices in a
hunter-gatherer context [12]. Ethnoarchaeology is understood here not only under the per-
spective of “living archaeology” [15,16], but as a methodological approach in archaeology that
aims to develop new methods and hypotheses [9–11].
The main objective of the case study is to assess the development of cooperation in a hunter-
fisher-gatherer society that called itself “Yamana” during the 19th and 20th centuries [17] and in-
habited the southernmost part of the Fuegian archipelago (South America). The WWHW
model (WaveWhen Hale Whale) is based on data provided by the rich ethnographic record
about this society and focuses on a particular set of practices, norms and decisions that arose
whenever a cetacean was stranded on the coasts of Yamana territory. According to written
sources, when Yamana people discovered a beached whale they could either announce it public-
ly through four smoke signals and share it with others, or keep all its resources for themselves
[17–20]. When the people signalled their find, an aggregation event could take place where a
high number of families that usually experienced their everyday lives in small groups would
gather together to take advantage of the natural accumulation of resources. This unpredictable
but regular event (see below) fostered youth initiation ceremonies and strengthened social
bonds and norms. Within the Yamana these kind of cooperative attitudes were encouraged not
only through education, but also by means of social regulations [17]). Promotion occurred
through mechanisms such as reputation, but so did different types of punishment [17,21,22]
In the first stage of our research, we established the main entities, variables and scales of the
model and explored the effects of specific parameters in promoting cooperation, such as social
reputation, the chance to find the resource and, consequently, to detect a defector (measured
though vision parameter) [12]. The results showed the high relevance of social reputation and
imitation strategies for maintaining cooperative practices even with low visibility values (since
people agents can only replicate observable behaviours).
This paper focuses on a key organisational element in hunter-gatherer societies: mobility
strategies and the distribution of resources. In our previous article, human agents moved ran-
domly and whale agents appeared from time to time on different coastal places or “patches”. In
this experiment, Lévy flight movement has been incorporated into the model in order to repro-
duce more realistic behaviour for people agents. Previous studies have shown that this kind of
movement represents an important mobility pattern for hunter-gatherers when searching for
resources that are heterogeneously distributed [23].
At the same time, the information provided by different researches showed that although
cetacean strandings are random phenomena, they tend to reoccur in the same geographical
areas. To build a more realistic environment, in this paper we define areas with differential
probabilities for whales to become stranded.
Therefore, these experiments allow us to define the real possible scenarios that could help to
raise cooperative behaviours within the context of aggregation events, considering the geo-
graphical setting and these groups’management of the territory.
Materials and Methods
Archaeological and ethnographic sources
Mobility and cooperation. It is widely accepted that mobility strategies play an important
role in structuring hunter-gatherer organisation and how they manage inhabited territories
[24]. There are two central questions in relation to this topic: the reasons why hunter-gatherers
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move around the landscape in a particular way and what their movement patterns are like.
Thus, knowledge and predictability about resource distribution, as well as food preferences,
play an essential role in mobility strategies.
The well-known forager-collector continuum, proposed by Binford in 1980 and strongly
based on resource distribution, has been one of the more prominent models applied to tackle
this issue [25]. According to Binford, foragers make residential moves in pursuit of resources
while collectors acquire more distant resources, sending small logistic groups out to collect and
bring them back to a central camp. However, several researchers have pointed out that mobility
was not simply linked to resource depletion but also strengthened social ties, helped in the search
for mates and also facilitated the exchange of information and goods (for example [26–30]).
Hunter-gatherer displacement patterns were traditionally explained as random walks like in
Brownian motion, a concept originally formulated to define the movement of microscopic par-
ticles. Nowadays, various models and approaches seek to understand the underlying mecha-
nisms that lead to a particular movement pattern [31]. One such model is the Lévy flight
pattern, which has been observed in many animal species such as wandering albatrosses [32],
spider monkeys and marine predators [33], although some of them have been recently proven
to contain flaws [31,34]. Moreover, the theoretical work of Viswanathan et al. [35] states that
Lévy flight with exponent μ = 2 is an optimal search strategy in environments with scarce, ran-
domly placed resources that can be revisited because they are not depleted during consump-
tion. This has led to the emergence of the Lévy flight foraging hypothesis, later confirmed by
empirical studies (e.g. [36]). This foraging strategy is deemed optimal, and thus central in
human evolution [33]. The Lévy flight pattern has been observed not only in human and ani-
mal mobility, but also in online games [37] and in human cognition [38].
Lévy flight has also been applied to the study of hunter-gatherer mobility, with an exponent
near the optimum value to explain the movement pattern of the Dobe Ju/’hoansi living in de-
serted areas of Botswana and Namibia [39], whose seasonal behaviour is driven by water avail-
ability. Other empirical research found that approximately half the foraging patterns of the
Hadza societies in northern Tanzania match Lévy walk patterns, showing that more than one
foraging pattern can coexist [23].
Movement of coastal hunter-fisher-gatherers: the Yamana case study. Yamana people
were aquatic hunter-fisher-gatherers (following [40]) specialised in the management and ex-
ploitation of marine resources who used canoes to move across the territory [17]. Their diet
was mostly based on the consumption of sea mammals, seashells, birds, guanacos and fish.
These resources seem to have had a relatively homogeneous spatial distribution and most of
them were not seasonally constrained [21]. Historical documents show that the Yamana had
high residential mobility with frequent and short movements, similar to a foraging strategy ac-
cording to Binford’s model.
Written sources point out that people self-identified in relation to specific spaces where they
were born or lived [19], naming them, for example Canagush Yamana, Putroaya Yamana,
Wullaia Yamana or Lashuf Yamana [17,41,42] as “Yamana” is the word for “Humanity” in
their own language [43]. These places included bays and beaches stretching several kilometres.
However, longer distances between residential locations were also recorded [20,44].
The Yamana usually moved in very small groups, but on some occasions several social units
or households could spend some time together (visiting relatives or performing social activities
during aggregation events [21]). Following ethnographical sources, aggregation events could
happen when cetaceans or fishes were stranded on the coasts, providing a natural and abun-
dant source of food. These specific aggregations afforded the scenario for a rise in cooperative
practices to the extent that people who discovered a whale drifted ashore had to notify the near-
by families or groups using smoke signals in order to share the abundance of food and raw
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materials [17,20]. Breaking this rule brought social sanction and conflict among the Yamana
people [45].
Three interesting points were recorded in historical documents in relation to Yamana mo-
bility patterns and aggregation events. First, several accounts hold that those episodes brought
together “local people” as well as families that came from different places [46]. Second, the
news of a beached whale spread from distant areas [47,48]. Third, some accounts mention that
the Yamana made specific trips along their territory in order to detect stranded whales [49].
Under the WWHWmodel, mobility played an important role since it allowed Yamana peo-
ple to discover not only beached whales, but also non-cooperative agents. Lévy flight walks
may be useful to model Yamana mobility since, in the case of cetaceans, we are dealing with a
resource spread across space [23,50].
Current research on cetacean strandings has showed that they do not occur homogeneously,
but tend to concentrate geographically in relation to migratory and reproductive routes.
Malvinas-Falklands and Tierra del Fuego Islands are in fact one of the 23 most frequent areas
worldwide for Ziphiidae (beaked whale) strandings [51]. Ethnographic and historical informa-
tion from Tierra del Fuego, combined with present-day records, provide a partial record of
these phenomena and enable us to identify areas where strandings occur more frequently [52].
Mobility strategies related to strandings would probably have changed throughout the years
in relation to the higher frequency of a particular species. Whale strandings have mainly been
recorded between March and May, although different sources give contrasting information. In
fact, records from the late 19th century indicate a concentration of strandings between March
and April [53].
Therefore, according to historical and ethnographical information, there would have been
areas and periods where and when the possibility of a cetacean getting stranded would have
been higher. Although this fact is not considered under our model, Yamana people would
probably move within the territory taking into consideration the heterogeneous distribution in
time and space of this particular and valuable resource.
An agent-based model
The next sections describe the model following the ODD documentation protocol [54]. The
computational model is implemented in NetLogo 5.0 [55] and the corresponding source code
may be downloaded at the following website http://www.openabm.org/model/4249.
Overview: purpose. TheWave When Hale Wale (WWHW) [12] is an agent-based model
designed to allow the exploration of the emergence, resilience and evolution of cooperative be-
haviours in hunter-fisher-gatherer societies, using the Yamana society with an example when
confronted with a dilemma of whether to share resources.
In this extension of the model, we test the influence of some factors that might affect the
evolution of cooperation:
• A mechanism of indirect reciprocity to promote cooperation that conditions people’s capaci-
ty to gain social capital from others in aggregations (as in [12]).
• The characteristics of natural events that generate cooperation opportunities, i.e. stochasti-
city, unpredictability, spatial distribution and limited visibility.
• Human walking patterns, in particular random walk and Lévy flight movements.
We also suppose an evolutionary mechanism of imitation of the two strategies (i.e. always
cooperate and always defect) considered in the model.
Resource Spatial Correlation, Hunter-Gatherer Mobility and Cooperation
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Overview: entities, state variables, and scales. There are two kinds of agents in the
model: people and whales. People agents represent households/canoes moving around the en-
vironment looking for a beached whale. A whale agent is an unpredictable and scarce resource,
which implies a valuable and perishable food resource for people. From time to time, a whale
beaches and any people agent that finds it needs to make a decision about whether to call other
people to share the resource or not. People are mobile agents while whales are static. The num-
ber of people in the model remains constant during simulation.
The environment is defined by a square grid of MxM cells, i.e. patches. Patches can repre-
sent beach, water or land (Fig 1). The number of beach patches is determined by the parameter
beach-density, i.e. the fraction of beach patches, while the fraction (1- beach-density) of patches
is equally divided between water and land. To create a spatial distribution closer to a real sce-
nario, instead of dividing the landscape into simply randomly chosen beach, land and water
patches, we created processes to scatter the land and beach patches over the water landscape.
After scattering them, we classified the non-water patches into two categories: the land (the
patches surrounding the starting point of the scattering process) and the beach (the patches
further away).
The model is characterised by a set of state variables: the study parameters, the agents’ vari-
ables and the global variables. The study parameters (Table 1) are defined by the user in each
simulation as a configuration of an experiment, determining a scenario and remaining constant
during a simulation run.
Fig 1. Snapshot of a 201x201 patch environment. Blue cells represent water, yellow represent beach and
brown stands for land.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g001
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People and whale agents are characterised by the state variables that appear in Table 2 and
Table 3, which can be changed during a simulation. The global parameters are accessory pa-
rameters that complete the definition of the model (Table 4).
The environment is a 2D space whose dimensions can be adjusted to accommodate differ-
ent spatial scales. The temporal scale of the model is also flexible. Each simulation time step
(i.e. tick) can vary from days to weeks or months, depending on the values of the parameters:
prob-beached-whale, which determines the number of whales beached in a period; and
Table 1. Study parameters.
Parameter name Brief description
beach-density Percentage of beach patches of the total number of patches in the
environment.
people-density Number of people compared with the total number of patches.
beached-whale-
distribution
Type of beached whale distribution in the space, i.e. uniform (every beach
patch has the same probability of beaching) or gaussian-σ (the beaching
probabilities of beach patches follows a 2D Gaussian with the mean placed at
the middle of the space and a standard deviationσ that modulates the spatial
dispersion of beachings).
prob-beached-whale At each time step, a whale beaches with a probability prob-beached-whale.
movement Type of people agents’ movement, i.e. random walk or Lévy ﬂight (modelled
as a truncated Cauchy function)
distance-walked-per-tick In random walk movement, it is the distance (measured by the the number of
patches) that a people agent can walk each time step.
vision A whale can be seen within a maximum circular area of radius vision. This
parameter is measured by the number of patches.
signal-range Maximum distance that a signal (e.g. smoke) created by people to announce
a beached whale can be seen. It is measured by the number of patches.
prob-mutation Probability of an error or an exploratory strategy in the imitation of people’s
strategies.
rounds-per-generation People can change their decision strategies every rounds-per-generation time
steps.
social-capital-vs-meat-
sensitivity
Relative importance of the social capital compared with meat in the ﬁtness
function of a people agent (Eq 4). This ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 implies
that the meat has no importance for the ﬁtness of a people agent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.t001
Table 2. People state variables.
Parameter name Brief description
prob-cooperation A people agent that has found a (non-public) beached whale makes it public, i.e.
makes it much more visible, with a probability prob-cooperation.
last-public-prob-
cooperation
This variable is updated with a people agent’s prob-cooperation if she has
found a whale and any other people agent has seen her making it public
(cooperating) or doing the opposite (defecting).
meat Stock of whale meat held by a people agent (Eq 2 and Eq 5).
social-capital Stock of social capital acquired by a people agent (Eq 3 and Eq 5).
ﬁtness Success of a people agent’s strategy, which is determined by the variables meat
and social-capital (Eq 4).
reputation Reputation of a people agent. This ranges from 0 to 1 (Eq 1)
n-calls-history Vector of size history-size that contains the number of times a people agent has
been seen cooperating in the last history-size periods.
n-been-caught-history Vector of size history-size that contains the number of times a people agent has
been seen defecting in the last history-size periods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.t002
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distance-walked-per-tick, cauchy-scale and cauchy-location, which define the distance people
move each tick depending on the type of movement.
Overview: process overview and scheduling. The scheduling of the model execution in
discrete time steps is shown in Fig 2. The submodels are explained in detail in the Submodels
subsection. The order in which the agents perform the actions is random, avoiding privileging
first-acting consequences. The update of the state variables is asynchronous.
Design concepts: basic principles. The basic principle underlying this model is the coop-
erative phenomenon of indirect reciprocity. When Yamana people find a beached whale, they
face the dilemma of whether to cooperate and share the resource with other Yamana or to de-
fect and exploit the whale alone. They have established a reputation mechanism to promote co-
operation and punish defections. Moreover, the model incorporates the basic principle of an
evolutionary mechanism in imitating the individual strategies.
Design concepts: emergence. This model shows the emergence of cooperation or defec-
tion in Yamana society, a non-trivial outcome that depends on the characteristics of beachings
(e.g. stochasticity, spatial distribution, visibility), human walking patterns (e.g. Lévy fligt, ran-
dom walk), and other social features such as the reputation and imitation processes.
Design concepts: adaptation. The only adaptive trait of people agents is the cooperative
trait, i.e. prob-cooperation, which determines the probability of cooperating when a people
agent finds a beached whale.
Table 3. Whale state variables.
Parameter
name
Brief description
my-range Radius of visibility of a whale (measured by the number of patches). This radius is equal
to vision (people’s vision) if the whale is not public, and equal to signal-range of the
whale has been made public.
caller People that made the whale public by making a call.
public? Boolean. True if the whale is public, false otherwise.
life Number of periods the whale remains in the environment until it has completely rotted.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.t003
Table 4. Global parameters.
Parameter name Brief description
beach-whale-life Percentage of the rounds-per-generation that a beached whale stays in the model.
It is set to 0.5.
history-size Size of the vectors n-calls-history and n-been-caught-history
history-past-
discount
The discount factor δ of Eq 1 that takes into account how important the shadow of
the past is in terms of reputation.
marginal-function-
alpha
Term α of Eq 2 and Eq 3. It is set to 0.1.
marginal-function-
mu
Term μ of Eq 2 and Eq 3. It is set to 0.
cauchy-scale Scale parameter of the truncated Cauchy distribution for Lévy ﬂight movement,
which speciﬁes the half-width at half-maximum. It is set to a value such that the
average agents’ step length per tick corresponds to one of the study values {4,6,8}.
cauchy-location Location parameter of the truncated Cauchy distribution for Lévy ﬂight movement,
specifying the location of the peak of the distribution. It is set to 0.
gaussian-std-dev Standard deviation σ of the Gaussian beached-whale-distribution determined by
the type of gaussian-σ.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.t004
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Fig 2. Diagram of the implementation schedule.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g002
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Design concepts: objectives. The success of people agents is measured by the fitness func-
tion (Eq 4), regarding the incomes of meat and social capital people achieve, which correspond
respectively to food and social resources. Social capital abstracts benefits that contribute posi-
tively to the agent’s fitness generated from diverse social activities such as knowledge transmis-
sion, cultural interchange or social relationships, in contrast to pure eating resources collected
by food variable. The relative importance of meat versus social capital is weighed by the param-
eter social-capital-vs-meat-sensitivity.
Design concepts: learning. The model reproduces an evolutionary mechanism of imita-
tion of successful strategies.
Design concepts: sensing. People can perceive the presence of whales in their surround-
ings, limited by a certain vision range.
Design concepts: interaction. When an aggregation occurs, i.e. a whale is found, people
can interact with others by means of: rewarding cooperation and punishing defection (reputa-
tion Eq 1), and sharing meat and social capital.
Design concepts: stochasticity. The submodels that include stochasticity are: the beaching
of whales, the patterns of movement (random walk and Lévy flight), the probability of cooper-
ating (sharing a beached whale), the imitation of strategies and the probability of mutation.
Design concepts: collectives. When two or more people are in the location where a whale
beached, an aggregation event occurs, with activities of reward and punishment for behaviours
(reputation), sharing meat and exchanging social capital.
Design concepts: observation. Observation of the model includes the spatial distribution
of people and whale agents, the average probability of cooperation, the average reputation of
people and other social and economic magnitudes as seen in Fig 3.
Initialization. The user initializes the process by selecting the study parameters’ values in
the interface, corresponding to the scenario to be simulated. The agents and the environment
are then created according to this parameterisation.
Fig 3. Interface of the model implementation in NetLogo.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g003
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Submodels. The model consists of the following submodels (Fig 2) that are
executed sequentially.
Submodels: beach a whale. Each tick, a whale beaches with a probability prob-beached-
whale. The beaching place is selected between beach patches according to the beached-whale-
distribution, i.e. uniform (every beach patch has the same probability of beaching) or gaussian-
σ (the beaching probabilities follow a 2D Gaussian with mean placed at the middle of the space
and a standard deviation σ that modulates the spatial dispersion of beachings).
Submodels: whale be seen. Whales can be seen within a circular area defined by a radiusmy-
range (of each whale agent). People agents inside this circular area that were not heading toward
another whale set this whale as their target and move toward this whale in the following ticks.
Submodels: people move. If a people agent has seen a whale (i.e. her target), she walks to-
wards the target whale the average distance for the type of walk pattern. Otherwise, she moves
according to the walk pattern selected for the simulation. For the random walk pattern, the peo-
ple agent walks a distance distance-walked-per-tick in a random direction. For the Lévy flight
pattern, the direction of the movement is also random, but the distribution of steps lengths has
been modelled with a Cauchy distribution, which is a particular case of the Lévy or stable distri-
butions with a characteristic exponent α = 1 and that corresponds to the optimum exponent
μ = 2 of the Lévy foraging hypothesis [33,56]. In our implementation, like in Viswanathan’s for
Lévy flight [33] [33], when a walker sees a target, the step length is truncated; this is sometimes
called “target-truncated Lévy Flight” but it is nothing more than the standard Lévy flight [56].
In addition, we have implemented the truncated Lévy flight [33,57], in which the tails of the
probability distribution are limited in the upper side to avoid the physical impossibility of a dis-
tribution of step lengths with diverging variance in nature. Hence, the distance a people agent
walks per tick follows a truncated Cauchy distribution of parameters cauchy-scale and cauchy-
location, with a minimum distance of 1, corresponding to a movement of one patch distance,
and a maximum equal to the half of the side of the 2D square world.
Submodels: people make a decision about making the whale public. A people agent that
has found a whale makes the decision whether to call other people (cooperate) and share the
whale, or to keep it for herself (defect). A people agent cooperates with a probability prob-
cooperation (agent’s variable). If the people agent decides to make a call to announce the bea-
ched whale, the whale becomes public (whale’s state variable public? is set to true) and the
range within which the whale can be seen is incremented from vision (natural distance in
which a people agent can see a food resource) to signal-range (range of call signals).
Submodels: check for aggregations. A whale in whose location there are two or more
people agents is considered an aggregation.
Submodels: people reward others’ behaviours. People’s reputation is a function (Eq 1) of
their individual history of past actions. This history keeps the last history-size generations of two
vectors: n-calls-history and n-been-caught-history. If a people agent decides to call everyone else
(cooperate) when she finds a (non-public) beached whale, and there is at least a witness to her
action, she adds a unit in the current generation period of n-calls-history (once per aggregation).
However, if the agent decides not to call others (defect) and there are witnesses to that defection,
she adds a unit (per beach not shared) in the current generation period of n-been-caught-history.
Submodels: people update reputation. Each people agent updates her reputation Ri com-
puting the division of two moving averages:
Ri ¼
Xh
j¼1
ð # CooperatejÞdj
Xh
j¼1
ð # Cooperatej [ # BeSeenDefectingjÞdj
2 ½0; 1 Eq:1
Resource Spatial Correlation, Hunter-Gatherer Mobility and Cooperation
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Where #Cooperatej is the jth element of the vector n-calls-history and #BeSeenDefectingj is the
jth element of the vector n-been-caught-history. The δ 2 [0,1] is the global parameter history-
past-discount, which takes into account the shadow of the past, i.e. the importance of past
events in the present. A value close to 1 gives the same importance (the maximum) to the past
as to the present; a value close to 0 despises past events.
It is important to note that the reputation of a people agent is only affected by cooperation
or defection actions conducted while been observed by others. If she defects but is not caught,
her reputation does not change; similarly, if she cooperates but nobody answers the call, her
reputation does not change either. This feature matches the hypothesis that reputation is a
kind of social tag that someone always receives from others and cannot be changed by the
owner. In the particular case that a people agent does not have history of past cooperation and/
or defection actions, she takes the current average reputation of the population as hers.
Submodels: people eat whale and get social capital. We model a stylised abstraction of
the process of gettingmeat and social-capital (people’s variables) assuming that the number of
ticks that a whale stays in the model is fixed (beach-whale-life global parameter), and the mar-
ginal gain (gain per tick) of these stock variables for any individual depends only on their
reputation and the number of people in the aggregation at each moment. In particular, the
marginal gain of meat a people agent can achieve ΔMi(t) depends on the number N of people
in the aggregation as follows:
DMiðtÞ ¼ eaððNðtÞ1ÞmÞ
2
with DMiðtÞ  0 Eq:2
This equation formalizes a bell curve of parameters α and μ. The function shows increasing
and decreasing returns depending on the value of μ. In order to represent the most critical sce-
nario for the evolution of cooperation, μ is set equal to zero so that we focus our study in the
part of the function with decreasing returns.
Besides, in an aggregation event, people exchange social capital. We suppose that the
amount of social capital that a people agent can get is modulated by her reputation (a people
agent with a bad reputation is not desirable company in an aggregation), and increases with the
number of people in the event. The marginal social capital gain per tick ΔSCi(t) that a people
agent can get in an aggregation of size N is described with the equation:
DSCiðtÞ ¼ Rið1 eaðNðtÞ1Þ
2Þwith DSCiðtÞ  0 Eq:3
Where α is the same parameter as in Eq 2.
This function monotonically increases with the number of people N in an aggregation, and
has a higher asymptote at the reputation of the agent Ri. This behaviour fits with the hypothesis
that the social capital increases with the number of people until a maximum, in which new peo-
ple suppose redundant information or a limitation in the exchange of social capital. S1 Fig
shows the plots of the curves of the marginal gain of meat and social capital (Eqs 2 and 3).
Submodels: people select strategies. The success of a people agent’s strategy is quantified
with the fitness function:
FiðtÞ ¼ ySCiðtÞ þ ð1 yÞMiðtÞ with y 2 ½0; 1 Eq:4
where
SCiðtÞ ¼ SCiðt  1Þ þ DSCiðtÞ
MiðtÞ ¼ Miðt  1Þ þ DMiðtÞ
Eq:5
The ﬁtness function is weighted by a parameter θ that represents the relative importance of
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social capital over meat, i.e. social-capital-vs-meat-sensitivity parameter, allowing us to explore
how this relative importance affects the evolution of cooperation.
Every generation, i.e. a period of rounds-per-generation ticks, people can imitate the best
strategies of other people. The process of strategy imitation is similar to a roulette wheel, where
each people agent randomly chooses another from the population with a probability directly
proportionate to fitness; if the picker has less fitness, she copies the last-public-prob-cooperation
of her choice. The hypothesis behind this assumption is that one can only imitate the observ-
able behaviour of people. Each people agent updates her last-public-prob-cooperation variable
with her prob-cooperation value whenever her behaviour is made public, i.e. she finds a beached
whale, she calls other people and someone answers the call, or she does not call and someone
sees the defection.
In addition, there may be some errors in the imitation process or a people agent may delib-
erately decide to explore new strategies, so a people agent chooses randomly with a probability
prob-mutation a strategy between the strategy space.
After this imitation process, the people’s state variables meat, social capital and fitness are
initialised to zero, while the reputation and past history vectors keep their values.
Computational analysis techniques
In order to study the general behaviour of the model and the interactions between the model
parameters and the output dynamics, we have applied Latin Hypercube Sampling, Classifica-
tion and Regression Trees and Random Forests.
Exploring parameter space in ABM is generally difficult when the number of parameters is
quite large. There is no a priori rule to identify which parameters are more important and their
ranges of values. Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) is a statistical technique for sampling a mul-
tidimensional distribution that can be used for the design of experiments to fully explore a
model parameter space providing a parameter sample as even as possible [58]. It consists of
dividing the parameter space into S subspaces, dividing the range of each parameter into N
strata of equal probability and sampling once from each subspace. If the system behaviour is
dominated by a few parameter strata, LHS guarantees that all of them will be presented in the
random sampling.
The multidimensional distribution resulting from LHS has got many variables (model pa-
rameters), so it is very difficult to model beforehand all the possible interactions between vari-
ables as a linear function of regressors. Instead of classical regression models, we have used
other statistical techniques. Classification and Regression Trees (CART) are non-parametric
models used for classification and regression [59]. A CART is a hierarchical structure of nodes
and links that has many advantages: it is relatively smooth to interpret, robust and invariant to
monotonic transformations. We have used CART to clarify the relations between parameters
and to understand how the parameter space is divided in order to explain the dynamics of the
model. One of the main disadvantages of CART is that it suffers from high variance (a tenden-
cy to overfit). Besides, the interpretability of the tree may be rough if the tree is very large, even
if it is pruned.
An approach to reduce variance problems in low-bias methods such as trees is the Random
Forest, which is based on bootstrap aggregation [60]. We have used Random Forests to deter-
mine the relative importance of the model parameters. A Random Forest is constructed by fit-
ting N trees, each from a sampling with dataset replacement, and using only a subset of the
parameters for the fit. The trees are aggregated together in a strong predictor by means of the
mean of the predictions of the trees that form the forest in the regression problem. Approxi-
mately one third of the data is not used in the construction of the tree in the bootstrapping
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sampling and is known as “Out-Of Bag” (OOB) data. This OOB data may be used to determine
the relative importance of each variable in predicting the output. Each variable is permuted at
random for each OOB set and the performance of the Random Forest prediction is computed
using the Mean Standard Error (MSE). The importance of each variable is the increase in MSE
after permutation. The ranking and relative importance obtained is robust, even with a low
number of trees [61].
We use CART and Random Forest techniques over simulation data from a LHS to take an
initial approach to system behaviour that enables the design of more comprehensive experi-
ments with which to study the logical implications of the main hypothesis of the model.
Results
General behaviour
The parameter space is defined by the study parameters (Table 1) and the global parameters
(Table 4). Considering the objective of this work, two parameters, i.e. the location parameter of
the truncated Cauchy distribution cauchy-location and the peak location of the marginal gain
of meatmarginal-function-mu, have been removed of the LHS; for the remaining 18 parame-
ters we have explored a range of values (Table 5) according to the characteristics of the case
study, e.g. small dense population, medium beach density. Note that two of the parameters are
discrete, i.e.movement{“random-walk”,”levy-flight”} and beached-whale-distribution
{“uniform”,”gaussian”}, while the rest are continuous.
In order to carry out a LHS, we have divided the range of each continuous parameter into
N = 4000 strata, compounded 4xN experiments (corresponding to product space of the two
discrete parameters) in which each continuous parameter has been sampled randomly from
one of its stratum randomly selected, and run each experiment 105 time periods (i.e. time
limit). For all simulations, the average cooperation, i.e. the average number of cooperators in
the population, has been recorded.
Table 5. Parameters of the LHS.
Parameters Range explored
beached-whale-distribution {uniform;Gaussian}
movement {random-walk;levy-ﬂight}
beach-density [0.25,0.75]
people-density [0.001,0.01]
prob-beached-whale [0.01,0.5]
distance-walked-per-tick [1,13]
vision [2,50]
signal-range [50,100]
prob-mutation [0.01,0.1]
rounds-per-generation [25,75]
social-capital-vs-meat-sensitivity [0,1]
beached-whale-life [0.25,0.75]
history-size [1,20]
history-past-discount [0.5,1]
marginal-function-alpha [-1,0]
cauchy-scale [1,5]
gaussian-std-dev [5,100]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.t005
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We focus the analysis on the stationary regime of the system, at which the influence of the
initial conditions has disappeared and the system state persists over time. The standard devia-
tion of the average cooperation in the last 10,000 time steps of a run is very small for most of
the experiments (S2 Fig), which is consistent with the assumption of a persistent regime at the
previously fixed time limit.
A CART has been fit to the LHS data in order to enlighten the relationship between model
parameters and the stationary behaviour as much as possible. The R package “rpart” [62] has
been used to grow the CART tree until each node contains a small number of instances and
then use cost-complexity pruning to remove irrelevant leaves. The resulting tree (after pruning)
is too large to be easily understood since all parameters are important to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, so we have pruned the tree to improve interpretability using the parametersminsplit = 20
and cp = 0.01. The resulting pruned CART is showed in Fig 4.
Interpretation of the pruned tree should be prudent, because CARTs often show high vari-
ance (i.e. tendency to overfit the data). Therefore, the CART of Fig 4 is used as a first approach
to system behaviour and a guideline to proceed with a more exhaustive computational analysis
described in the next section. The first decision node in the CART uses the prob-mutation pa-
rameter in the condition. The particular condition value can be interpreted as a split point be-
tween exploration and learning of strategies. Small values of mutation limit the probabilities of
escape for those states determined by the main forces that lead agents’ learning, i.e. the indirect
reciprocity mechanism, the visibility and the stochasticity of beachings. For that reason, the de-
tailed analysis of the model focuses on the first right leave of the CART.
Fig 4. Pruned regression tree for average cooperation within the time limit. The CART uses the LHS data. Each decision node shows the condition
used to divide the data, along with the number of runs after the split and the corresponding average of cooperation. The resulting subset on the left side
satisfies the conditions while the subset on the right side does not. The maximumCART has been pruned with minsplit = 20 (i.e. the minimum number of
observations that must exist in a node to try a split) and cp = 0.01 (i.e. complexity parameter).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g004
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To solve the overfitting problem and to get a better understanding of the model parameters,
we have used a Random Forests implemented with the “randomForest” R package [61]. Fig 5
shows the parameter importance using the Mean Standard Error (MSE) reduction of each per-
muted parameter over the OOB dataset [60]. The interpretation of these results is much more
trustworthy because these importance predictions with a Random Forests are more stable and
robust to changes in data [61]. The results confirm the importance of the mutation parameter
along with prob-beached-whale, social-capital-versus-meat-sensitivity, vision, beached-whale-
distribution and distance-walked-per-tick (all of them with over 20% increase in the MSE),
which govern the main hypothesis of the model, from indirect reciprocity to the beachings and
agents’movement.
Comprehensive design of experiments
Once the model has been analysed to understand the relative importance of the parameters in
terms of the level of cooperation reached in the population, we focus the analysis on the two
fundamental aspects of this article: the type of movement and the spatial correlation of the
Fig 5. Parameter importance. A random forest with mtry = 18/3 (where 18 is the number of parameters) and
ntree = 300 (for this value the MSE is stabilised) has been implemented. The permutation-based MSE
reduction is used as the criterion of importance to rank the model parameters. By randomly permuting
predictors (i.e. parameters) and observing howmuch the MSE grows, the more important a predictor, the
more increase in the MSE is expected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g005
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resource distribution. More specifically, we have carried out a set of simulations in order to ex-
plore the influence of the: (1) different importance levels of indirect reciprocity (social-capital-
vs-meat-sensitivity (θ) parameter), (2) different probability spatial distributions of beaching
events (beached-whale-distribution parameter) and (3) different types of movement of the
agents on the space (movement parameter). In all scenarios, we also test the influence of the fre-
quency of beaching (prob-beached-whale (Pbw) parameter) and its visibility (vision (v) parame-
ter). Table 6 shows the set of parameters that defines an experiment; the rest of the
parameterisation is described in S1 Table.
The ultimate goal is to better understand the behaviour of the model when the learning pro-
cess (the selection of the strategies with higher success) dominates the dynamics, so the muta-
tion level chosen has been fixed at a relatively high level in such a way that exploration of new
strategies is still present in the model, but not so much as to break this dominance. We have
replicated several random and independent samples for each experiment to get statistics accu-
rately enough. In short, the purpose is to study to what extent this combination of factors pro-
motes or does not cooperation.
Indirect reciprocity and cooperation
TheWWHWmodel implements an indirect reciprocity mechanism that promotes coopera-
tion, a stylised abstraction of the one used in Yamana society [12]. As we described in the
Methods section, this social mechanism is based on a reputation variable that relates the public
history of an individual agent and determines her capacity to gain social capital from others
when she participates in an aggregation. The social-capital-versus-meat-sensitivity parameter
(θ) modulates the relative importance of social capital in the agents’ fitness function, and con-
sequently the efficacy of the indirect reciprocity mechanism to promote cooperation, i.e. the
more importance of social capital, the more influence of reputation on agents’ fitness.
Fig 6 shows the results of a set of experiments carried out to study reciprocity under differ-
ent scenarios of the frequency of beachings (Pbw)and the visibility of these events (v). An ex-
haustive analysis is described in Briz et al [12]. In this paper we replicate these results and
summarise those that appear to be most relevant for the rest of this work.
When the indirect reciprocity mechanism does not have an effect on the system behaviour
(θ = 0), which corresponds to a limiting case of our society of hunter-fisher-gatherers when the
agents’ fitness is driven only by the consumption of meat, the level of cooperation is low in al-
most all values of vision, with the exception of a quite low value (v = 5). By contrast, coopera-
tion grows with the importance of social capital θ and consequently the indirect reciprocity
mechanism gains influence, approaching close to 1 for values of θ>0.1. These results are to be
expected, considering the nature of the social mechanism of indirect reciprocity implemented
in the model. It is much more significant to observe the effect of the parameter vision; since
Table 6. Comprehensive design of experiments.
Parameters Symbol Values explored
social-capital-vs-meat-sensitivity θ θ 2 {0,10−2,10−1.5,10−1,10–0.5,1}
beached-whale-distribution {Uniform;Gaussians(20,40,80)}
movement {random-walk;levy-ﬂight(4,6,8)}
prob-beached-whale Pbw Pbw 2 {0.05,0.2}
vision v v 2 {5,10,20,30,40}
Each experiment has been replicated 30 times. The maximum standard error for the statistics is included in the legends of the corresponding ﬁgures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.t006
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vision determines the visibility of beached whales and the chances of detecting defectors, there
is a trade-off that explains that for low vision values v = 10 there are more chances for a defec-
tor to consume whale alone and escape punishment; but greater values of vision increase the
opportunities of having to share the whale and simultaneously being punished and acquiring a
low reputation when defecting.
More interesting is the case of v = 5, where full cooperation is reached even for θ = 0. This
counterintuitive result is due to the hypothesis of the WWHWmodel, which assumes that only
public behaviours can be imitated. The cooperative strategy always becomes public because
people come to the call of a cooperator, but a defection is rarely detected for low values of vi-
sion and is rarely made public as a result. Therefore, the selection process mainly operates
under the cooperative strategy. In short, for low values of vision the model reproduces a case in
which there is a public-private discrepancy in the imitation, i.e. people imitate more successful
(private) strategies, but they also copy public information available about these strategies
which may not correspond to the real (private) strategies. In fact, this happens at the early
stages of the simulation, where there are defectors that are not being caught, hence their reputa-
tion is still good (cooperator-like).
Spatial concentration of beachings and cooperation
In the next set of experiments, we relax the assumption that beached whales are uniformly dis-
tributed over the space and consider other families of distributions closer, or at least more plau-
sible, to the historical distribution of beachings. In particular, we suppose that beached whales
follow a 2D Gaussian with the mean placed at the middle of the space and a standard deviation
σ that modulates the spatial dispersion of beachings. Fig 7 shows the level of cooperation for a
combination of different spatial distributions, i.e. uniform and Gaussians, and levels of impor-
tance of social capital θ, when the frequency of beachings Pbw and the visibility of these events
v vary. The bottom row of plots corresponding to a uniform distribution is identical to the re-
sults showed in Fig 6, and can be used as a benchmark for comparing the effects of the set of
Gaussian distributions, with increasing standard deviation σ, whose results are depicted in
each of the remaining rows of Fig 7.
The conclusion is quite evident: in all parameterisation scenarios, the spatial concentration
of beachings (five first rows of Fig 7) pushes up cooperation from the original levels reached by
effect of the indirect reciprocity mechanism (bottom row of Fig 7). These results corroborate
the intuitions about the Yamana case study: namely the spatial concentration of beachings,
Fig 6. Average cooperation and importance of social capital.Row of plots of the average cooperation <c> as a function of vision v for different levels of
importance of social capital θ, when the spatial distribution of beached whales is uniform in the space and the agents’movement is a randomwalk. The
maximum standard error of the average of cooperation of all experiments represented in the plots is 0.056.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g006
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defined in the model by the parameters σ and Pbw respectively, favour cooperation. The expla-
nation is that the spatial and temporal interactions of agents increase, and although any of
these events may conclude in cooperation or defection, the characteristics of cooperative be-
haviour facilitate the emergence of communities of cooperators that persist in time. In the
WWHWmodel, a cooperator always calls everyone else, and consequently attracts people to
the group; contrarily a defector never calls and consequently tends to separate from the group.
The cooperative behaviour prompts an unexpected mechanism of positive assortment, i.e. the
Fig 7. Average cooperation and spatial distribution of beached whales.Matrix of plots of the average cooperation <c> as a function of vision v for
different spatial distributions of beached whales (columns) and levels of importance of social capital θ (rows), when the agents’movement is a random walk.
The maximum standard error of the average of cooperation of all experiments represented in the plots is 0.056.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g007
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probability of interacting with a cooperator is greater for a cooperator than for a defector,
which promotes cooperation.
These dynamic communities (they continuously join and separate over time at the rhythm
of meetings around a beached whale) show another feature that favours cooperation. The spa-
tial proximity between agents works as a vigilance network that makes it very difficult for a de-
fector not to be caught and consequently makes defection very costly. This effect becomes
much more important as the importance of social capital grows in the society (given any spatial
distribution, note that the cooperation levels increases with θ in Fig 7).
The simulation results from the spatial distribution experiments we have just described,
which show that communities of cooperators required for supporting cooperation do not need
to be formal, i.e. agents know the community to which they belong perfectly; they may simply
be a result of informal meetings that repeat over time in a specific area. Within these informal
groups, two concurrent mechanisms seem to promote cooperation: the positive assortment of
cooperators and the vigilance network.
Lévy flight movement and cooperation
In the last set of experiments, we relaxed the assumption that agents move following a random
walk. Now, we assume Lévy flight movement much more similar to real human mobility pat-
terns discussed in the literature [31–33,35]. As we have just described in the Methods section,
we have implemented a truncated Cauchy function for the agents’ step length per tick, with a
minimum step length of 1, corresponding to a movement of one patch distance, and a maxi-
mum equal to the half of the side of the 2D square world. In order to compare this truncated
power law distribution of step length with the original random walk of fixed step length of 4
(patches), we choose the Cauchy parameters such that the average length is fixed for a complete
run. In particular we have explored a set of truncated Cauchy functions of {4, 6, 8} average step
lengths whose results are shown in Fig 8. Now, the first row of plots corresponds to the random
walk movement, identical to the results showed in Fig 6, and is used as a benchmark for com-
paring the effects of the increasing average step lengths of the Cauchy functions depicted in the
remaining rows.
The average step length of an agent is directly related to her diffusion capacity, i.e. the dis-
tance at which an agent can interact with other agents and the environment. You could expect
that greater diffusion capacity would cause the detection of “more things”, e.g. beached whales,
defectors or callings by cooperators, because the effective seeking area would be broader to the
extent that agents changed their seeking area more frequently, although its impact on the dy-
namics of the model may be more complex due to the vision parameter. Note that the type of
movement determines the distribution of places (patches) reachable at each tick, while vision
determines the seeking area from a place (patch) at each tick.
The effect of the Lévy flight movement is more visible for low values of θ 2 {10−2,10−1.5} for
which the indirect reciprocity mechanism is too weak and does not dominate the evolution of
cooperation. An initial conclusion is that a “Lévy-flight4”movement with an average step
length equal to the original random walk movement shows similar results than the last one (see
the second row of plots of Fig 8), although the patterns of both movements are obviously quite
different. Things change when the diffusive capacity of the Lévy flight movement increases.
For low values of vision (v = 10), we see that the public-private discrepancy, which produced
the emergence of unexpected cooperation when the movement was a random walk, decreases
significantly (see the two first columns of plots in Fig 8). The higher diffusion capacity of Lévy
flights {6, 8} increases the opportunities for detecting defectors, whose strategy now does take
part in the selection process. To show this effect better, we have computed the average
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imitations I

in which there was any discrepancy between the public and private strategies of
the agent imitated for a particular set of parameterisations (see Fig 9). Except of the limiting
case v = 5 corresponding to high cooperation (see Fig 8), it seems clear that the more diffusive
characteristic of Lévy flight reduces the discrepancy and consequently the abnormal levels of
cooperation reached for low values of vision (v = 10).
Assuming Lévy flight movement, e.g. “Lévy-flight8” in Fig 8, the disappearance of the
public-private discrepancy reveals the effects of vision on cooperation. When vision is low,
Fig 8. Average cooperation andmovement.Matrix of plots of the average cooperation <c> as a function of vision ν for different agents’ types ofmovement
(columns) and levels of importance of social capital θ (rows), when the spatial distribution of beached whales is uniform. The maximum standard error of the
average of cooperation of all experiments represented in the plots is 0.056.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g008
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a beached whale can be exploited almost exclusively, i.e. the probability of two or more agents
finding a whale is quite low. This effect is readily observable in Fig 10, which depicts the aver-
age amount of meatM over a complete simulation run for defectors and cooperators. A defec-
tor gets high averageM for low values of vision (v = 10), which is particularly significant with
“Lévy-flight8”movement that reduces the public-private discrepancy. In contrast, a cooperator
gets lower average meatM because she always calls and shares a beached whale, while a defec-
tor never calls.
However, the increase in the visibility of beached whales promotes cooperation to the detri-
ment of defection. Fig 11 shows the average amount of social capital SC over a complete simu-
lation run for defectors and cooperators, and is helpful for understanding this effect. Now, high
values of vision v = {30,40}increase the probability of finding a beached whale for all people, as
well as the chances that two or more agents might share the resource. Consequently, the aver-
age meat of defectors and cooperators converge as vision approaches the value of signal-range
50 (see Fig 10) because most agents share the food either intentionally (cooperators) or unin-
tentionally (defectors). Simultaneously, whenever there is an aggregation, cooperators get so-
cial capital, as we can see in Fig 11, which results in higher fitness than defectors, who get lower
social capital because they have lower reputations.
Fig 9. Public-private discrepancy in the imitations. Public-private discrepancy in the imitations for two
values of Pbw, and “random-walk” and “Lévy-flight8”movements, measured as the average imitations I
* over
a complete simulation run in which there was any discrepancy between the public and the private strategies
of the agent imitated. The spatial distributions of beached whales is uniform and θ = 10–1.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g009
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Finally, Fig 8 shows an interesting result. The effect of the Lévy flight movement is quite dif-
ferent depending on the frequency of beachings. Looking at the two first subplots of the case
“Lévy-flight8” in Fig 8, particularly for intermediate and high values of vision (v 20), we ob-
serve that cooperation with Pbw = 0.05 is higher than with Pbw = 0.2. In both cases the higher
diffusion capacity of Lévy flight reinforces the vigilance network, yet the cost of defection is
more important in the case of scarce resources (Pbw = 0.05), pushing up cooperation. When the
resource is more abundant (Pbw = 0.2) there are more opportunities for defectors to find a bea-
ched whale apart from the group of cooperators.
Discussion
The results of the simulations reinforce the idea of preservation of the context, e.g. continuity
of interaction patterns, as a key mechanism to foster and sustain cooperative behaviours in the
analysis of social dilemmas [63,64]. Previous research has shown that spatial or structured con-
texts in the Prisoner’s Dilemma favour cooperation [65–70]. In fact, one of the proposed five
rules for the emergence of cooperation [6], network reciprocity, is based on this effect. This be-
haviour is not exclusive to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, as the result has also been found in other
Fig 10. Average amount of meat for cooperators and defectors. Average amount of meat for cooperators
MC and defectorsMD over a complete simulation run for two values of Pbw, and “random-walk” and “Lévy-
flight8”movements. The spatial distributions of beached whales is uniform and θ = 10–1.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g010
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games [71,72]. Nor can it be generalised for all social dilemma models [65,73] under all condi-
tions [74–79].
Context preservation enhances the formation of communities based on frequent personal
non-anonymous interaction, which typically increases the alignment of individual and collec-
tive objectives. This effect is sometimes referred to as parochialism [80,81]. Communities influ-
ence the formation of pro-social norms predisposing them to cooperation and attenuating
coordination failures and the temptation of free-rider behaviour. The mechanism is usually ex-
plained by three forces [80]: 1) frequent interaction with the same agents stretches the shadow
of the future [7] and consequently gives incentives to cooperate and promote reciprocity while
avoiding punishing behaviour (retaliation effect); 2) since the interaction takes place in a fre-
quent and personal way and often with high clustering, low-cost access to information about
the behaviour is available to the rest of the population—in fact, reputation, the basis for indirect
reciprocity, requires that agents recognise and memorise others (reputation effect); 3) In com-
munities there is an additional tendency to encourage interactions among members of the
same communities instead of having relations with outsiders. This shifts the balance in the
Fig 11. Average amount of social capital for cooperators and defectors. Average amount of social
capital for cooperators SCC and defectors SCD over a complete simulation run for two values of Pbw, and
“random-walk” and “Lévy-flight8”movements. The spatial distributions of beached whales is uniform and
θ = 10–1.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121888.g011
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pro-social direction as a consequence of interaction frequency [82] and is called the segmenta-
tion effect. Additionally, while it is possible to coordinate in stable unfair norms with members
of other communities, it is more difficult among members of the same community [83–85].
The results of our model fit in the parochialism framework. Retaliation and reputation effects
are driven by the indirect reciprocity mechanism of the model and exclusion in terms of social
capital in case of an aggregation event, both based on the agent’s reputation. Although all the
members included in the model are supposed to belong to the same community, in some sense
the segmentation effect is also present as a consequence of the concentration of the population
towards the resource when there is spatial correlation in the distribution of the resource. As a
matter of fact, spatial correlation empowers all the mechanisms of parochialism. The roaming
paths are close to the resource for all the agents, so the frequency of interaction and the possibili-
ty of gathering reliable information about the rest of the agents increase and the concentration
of the population increases the odds of detecting a defector. The underlying network of vigilance
is denser when the resource is not uniformly distributed, and higher clustering and interconnec-
tedness promote cooperative social norms as previous research has indicated [86]. It is impor-
tant to notice that this effect occurs even in this model in which the movement of the population
is intentionally myopic. The agents are not endowed with memory about the location of the re-
source or learning capabilities to figure out the distribution. Higher levels of cooperation must
be expected in populations that include any learning dynamics.
Applying these outcomes to Yamana society allows us to go beyond ethnographic accounts,
which mainly emphasise the abundance of food provided by a cetacean stranding, yet several
interesting implications may also be discussed. First, aggregation events engendered social net-
works, which in turn promoted cooperation and fuelled future events to the extent that they re-
inforced social norms and the sense of belonging, reducing information costs and allowing
Yamana people to detect defectors. Once established, this network must have acquired its own
dynamic enabling it to reproduce and maintain itself and become a constitutive part of Yamana
society, shaping behaviours and practices. Thus, the self-identification of Yamana people to
particular spaces, revealed by ethnographic data, could have been underpinned and enhanced
by cooperative networks.
The higher frequency of aggregation events recorded in ethnographic sources, in compari-
son with the sparse data of defection, could be explained as a consequence of the payoff implied
in cooperative networks in terms of socio-economical relationships. Although it is unclear
when aggregations started between the hunter-gatherer societies under study, according to the
dynamics set up in the model, it could be predicted that defection would decrease over time.
The ethnographical information about cooperative dynamics in Yamana society (within the
context of an aggregation process) can be confirmed as reliable data with this model. At the
same time, it allows us to explore the internal social mechanisms that establish and maintain
social rules promoting cooperative attitudes. The ethnographic sources offer a general context
of social rules of cooperation, not only at exceptional times of abundance, but also when shar-
ing the products of everyday activities such as hunting, gathering and fishing.
From an archaeological point of view, the results of the simulations also allow a hypothesis
about the spatial distribution of aggregation areas. The parochialism effect rose as a result of
the heterogeneous occurrence of cetacean strandings, which would predict the potential areas
where these events could have taken place.
Within our ethnoarchaeological framework, this point is especially relevant when trying to
identify evidence of aggregation events in the archaeological record of the Beagle Channel
[10,13,14]. Coastal sectors with higher probabilities of cetacean strandings must be prioritised
in our quest of aggregation episodes to explore the archaeological markers of cooperation in
Yamana society.
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With regard to movement, previous research highlights the advantages of Lévy flight as a
foraging strategy when target sites are sparse and can be visited recurrently [33,35]. These
models align theory with the experimental foraging evidence found in different animal species
and human communities. However, the influence that this type of movement may have on
coupled social dynamics (e.g cooperative social norms) remains unknown. Results obtained
with this model suggest that although movement patterns are not a key factor promoting or
collapsing cooperation, Lévy flights can enhance cooperative behaviour modestly when the re-
source is scarce (defectors do not obtain the benefits of joint search) or/and the vision of agents
is limited (unfolding the private strategies of the population).
Data provided by ethnographic sources suggest sporadic out-of-range movements between
Yamana people (see above), including the effects of a “call” in case of whale stranding. Conse-
quently, following the results of our model Lévy flight movement would have also involved a
consistent mechanism of reinforcement of the cooperative rules in Yamana society that enables
them to detect strandings and defectors.
Conclusions
The Results section is mainly headed by two questions: how beaching spatial concentration and
Lévy flight movement influence cooperation. The results have been discussed and addressed to
the relevant literature in the Discussion section. They may be summarised as follows:
• The model presented here validates the dataset provided by historical sources in our Yamana
case study. Our results highlight that cooperation practices (within the context of aggregation
processes) were not an outcome of a fortuitous observation made by missioners or ethnogra-
phers in the early 20th century. Conversely, cooperative behaviours were fuelled by a social
dilemma and bolstered by a set of variables such us vision, reputation, mobility and stranding
spatial distribution. This model allowed us to disentangle the mechanisms and conditions
that promoted cooperation.
• The model presented here highlights that within the context of aggregation processes as doc-
umented in the ethnographic and historical sources, cooperation practices were fuelled by a
social dilemma and bolstered by a set of variables such as vision, reputation, mobility and
stranding spatial distribution. Conversely, the cooperative model allows us to disentangle the
mechanisms and conditions that promote cooperation and enables us to transcend detailed
and partial historical data.
• When beachings follow a 2D Gaussian, the spatial concentration of beached whales pushes
up cooperation from the original levels reached by the effect of the indirect reciprocity mech-
anism. The cooperative behaviour favours the emergence and preservation of informal and
dynamic communities that work as a vigilance network making defection very costly.
• When agents follow Lévy flight movement, assuming that a correlation exists between this
movement type and the large average step length, the distance or effective vision at which an
agent can interact with other agents and the environment grows, which means a greater abili-
ty to detect beached whales and more callings by cooperators and defectors. The ability to
detect defectors removes the public-private discrepancy in the imitation of strategies that
happens with random walks.
• Moreover, Lévy flight, with a large average step length, promotes cooperation when beachings
are scarce. In this scenario, the higher effective vision extends the vigilance network discourag-
ing defectors, who have few opportunities to prosper apart from the group of cooperators.
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• If the assumed correlation between Lévy flight and the large average step length is absent, the
movement pattern itself will not have as much influence in promoting cooperation, but the
average step length of the movement will be enough to explain the phenomena.
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S1 Fig. Curves of marginal gain of meat (left graph) and social capital (right graph) corre-
sponding to the equations Eq 2 and Eq 3 for different values of the parameter α. The pa-
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